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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper presents an empirical investigation into the relative prevalence of non-profit service 
delivery in the fields of residential elderly care and child care for children aged between 0 and 3 
years in Flanders. Traditionally, welfare services in Flanders are provided by either local 
government, by private not-for-profit organizations (often embeddded in religious or ideological 
networks), or by private for-profit organizations (commercial initiatives). The welfare sector in 
Flanders is a typical example of co-production of public service delivery between different 
sectors (public, private nonprofit and commercial). Each of these three ‘sectors’ can establish and 
manage organisations, such as residential homes, serviceflats and home-care in elderly care 
provision and day care centres or family day care in child care. These organisations operate on 
the local level, as close as possible to the clients, but are to a large extent regulated and financed 
by the central government (both federal and regional government). Over time, this has resulted in 
a dense network of service providers from different sectors (public and private) in both policy 
areas  in the 308 Flemish communities. As organisations of three sectors deliver services in both 
policy areas, studying prevalences seems promising for theorizing about the circumstances in 
which one or another sector prevails. In particular, the paper will look for possible explanations 
for the over- or underrepresentation of the non-profit sector in local service delivery.  
 
The paper has a descriptive and a theoretical explanatory component. Firstly, we will sketch the 
service delivery landscape in both policy fields at the Flemish level to facilitate further reading. 
Prevalence patterns in both sectors will be compared and discussed. Secondly, we will try to 
describe the extent to which organisations of three different sectors deliver residential elderly and 
child care at the local community level: (a) public organisations (organized by the local 
government), (b) private nonprofit organisations (mostly organized by ideological groups or 
religious congregations), and (c) private for profit or commercial organizations (organised by 
profit-seeking entrepreneurs). Thirdly, we will try to explain the descriptive findings. In this part 
we will address the question why a certain sectoral pattern (distribution of places in public versus 
private non-profit versus private for-profit sector) can be observed in a certain local community. 
Hypothetical explanations for the  observed patterns can be derived from a large literature that 
has been eloquently described by Anheier (2006, see also Gronbjerg & Paarlberg 2001, and 
Corbin 1999). By comparing prevalences in two policy areas, our design clearly has an added 
value in the testing of theory-based hypotheses. As one or more hypotheses can be confirmed in 
both areas, the validity of theoretical assumptions will be strenghtened. Fourthly, in the 
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conclusion we will relate our empirical findings to the theoretical frameworks, and we try to add 
to some of the policy-relevant discussions that are currently taking place concerning welfare 
service provision in general and elderly and child care provision in specific. To date, we do not 
know how the future sectoral pattern in Flemish elderly and child care will look like. Some prefer 
and advocate for a marketization of care and foster a growing private commercial sector, while 
other consider elderly and child care as a public responsibility that needs to be financed and 
organized by public means. These prefer a growing nonprofit sector. Hence, a fierce ideological 
debate is currently taking place about the future of welfare service provision  in Flanders.  
 
1. SERVICE DELIVERY IN FLEMISH ELDERLY AND CHILD CARE: THE 
COMPLEXITY DISENTANGLED 
 
As both policy areas count a lot of organisations and are characterised by a rather complex 
institutional design over the Belgian governmental levels, we start the paper with a short 
description of both policy areas in which we will sketch their institutional design, their service 
delivery organisations and their size (compared to demand indicators). 
 
Welfare policy in Belgium 
 
Flanders is a Dutch-speaking region in the federal state of Belgium.1 Belgian regions have their 
own parliament and government with extensive autonomous regional competences in (amongst 
other) the policy field of welfare services. These competences have been devolved from the 
federal to the regional level over time, as the result of some consecutive steps in the Belgian state 
reform process. This means that Flanders has law-making competences in the welfare area, 
although some (parts of) competences are still regulated and subsidised by the federal state.  
The local level -308 local communities, governed by their own elected local government- has 
some additional competencies with regards to welfare policy-making and is also responsible for 
the coordination of social policy at the local level. Its main role however consists of the delivery 
of  welfare services, either directed and subsidised by the federal or Flemish government, or 
delivered on their own initiative, financed by their own means.  
 
Why elderly and child care? 
                                                 
1
 The other regions are the Walloon region (French-speaking, 262 local communities) and the Brussels Capital region 
(bilingual, 19 local communities). 
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As mentioned above, we chose two policy areas to strengthen the testing of theory-based 
hypotheses about the prevalence of the public, non-profit and commercial sector in welfare 
service delivery. Analysing the Flemish welfare landscape, child care and elderly care turned out 
to the best areas to study for four reasons: 
1. The amount of places available in both policy areas is approximately equal.  
2. In the policy areas of child care and elderly care, all three sectors are to a large extent 
delivering services. 
3. Both areas are characterised by a strong central steering (regulation and subsidies), but 
service delivery happens at the local level in rather small care organisations.  
4. The target group of both areas can be neatly demarcated and the care needs are rather 
homogenous in each group. This is for instance less the case in a policy area dealing with 
disabled persons.  
Moreover, both policy areas share the characteristic that they became higly relevant last decade as 
increasing demands pressed the governments to expand the care capacity in both areas. 
Demographical trends2, but also societal evolutions (such as the higher amount of single parents, 
the decrease of informal family care and a higher labour market participation of women) will 
keep the expansion of both areas without a doubt on the political and policy agenda for the next 
decade.    
 
Residential elderly care in Flanders 
 
Professional elderly care in Flanders can be residential care or home care.  Home care means that 
people live in their own house, and receive professional assistance3 for some hours per week, or 
even daily. Residential care is about people moving permanently out of their house. These people 
can go to a residential home for elderly care (a so-called resthouse), or a serviceflat. A serviceflat 
offers less specialistic care than a residential home does, and is a care facility that attracts people 
that are able to live autonomously and independent. Residents can make use of facilities such as 
                                                 
2
 In Flanders the population is growing older at increasing speed. In 1996 there were approx. 940000 people older than 
85, in 2020 there will be 167000 people older than 85 years (more than 6% of the total population). Although the 
birth rate decreased for several years, it raised again since 2003, exponentially resulting in a growing demand for 
child care. In 2007 there were 8137 births more than in 2002 (67.862 versus 58.460).  
3
 This assistance can be nursery, for example some basic medical care, or bathing, or the assistance can be for basic 
tasks of a normal household (cleaning, cooking, shopping etc.). 
 5 
meals, leisure, etc. if they want to.4 People with special needs of a medical or nursery nature can 
go to a residential home were these care facilities are offered, besides common household 
facilities such as meals and leisure. The official definition (Decree 5-3-1985) of a residential 
home is “one or more buildings which alltoghethr form a facility for collective and permanent 
residence, where housing-facilities as well as facilities of household care and nursery care are 
offered to the residents”. Table 1 offers an overview of the demand for and supply of elderly 
care. 
 
Demand  Supply Residential 
homes 
Service 
flats 
Total 
Number of people 65+ 1.089.307 Number of residences 746 374 1120 
Number of people 80+ 277.514 Number of places 63.382 12.872 76.254 
Table 1: Demand and supply elderly care in Flanders (2005) 
 
There are approximately 76.000 places in residential homes and service flats. Most places (83%) 
are situated in residential homes.  These places are meant for all elderly people in Flanders. In 
2007, there were more than 1 million people older then 65 and 277.500 people older then 80 
years. However, the demand for residential elderly care is naturally less high, as a lot of old 
people manage to live autonomously or supported by informal care. Residential homes are then 
mainly services for older people with rather high caring needs. 20% of all people that are older 
than 80, and 35% of all people older than 95 live in residential homes. The average age of the 
resident is 84 years, and 75% of residents is female (Mostinckx & Deven 2008). Relatively 
spoken, there are 5,85 places in residential homes per 100 people older than 65 and 22 places per 
100 people older then 80 year. As residential homes are the dominant care service in elderly care, 
because the target groups of both elderly care services differ a lot and as the demand for service 
flats is of a different degree as the demand for residential care, we decided to focus only on the 
supply of elderly care in residential homes in this study. 
 
Residential elderly care in Flanders has a free admission, which means that people that want to 
make use of residential elderly care need to sign in with the provider of care they prefer. Often, 
there are long waiting lists, because many residences have reached their maximum-capacity. In 
some cases, care providers set criteria for admission (e.g. being older than 75). The Flemish 
government regulates the residential elderly care sector, and has an oversight on whether the 
quality norms are reached. If the norms about e.g. admission-policy, respect for ideological and 
                                                 
4
 The official definition (Decree 5-3-1985) of a serviceflat-building is “a complex of facilities that alltogether form a 
functional entity of individual flats where elderly people live self-reliant and can make use of common facilities of 
service delivery on an optional basis”.  
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religious belief of the resident, quality of services delivered, hygiene, etc. are reached, then 
Flemish government can recognize and concede the residential home, which is a necessary 
condition for establishing and managing an elderly care facility. Elderly care facilities that have 
received the Flemish governmental recognition, are subsidized both by the federal government 
and the Flemish government. Federal government subsidizes residential homes for medical and 
nursery care (via the health insurance system). The more people with special medical and nursery 
care needs in the residential home, the higher the subsidy. Flemish government subsidizes for 
investments in infrastructure and buildings for up to 60%, but this only applies to public and 
private nonprofit homes (Decree 18-12-1991, art.5§1). Similarly, only public and nonprofit 
homes receive subsidies by the Flemish government for the employment of animators in the 
residential home (1/2 FTE per 30 residents). Residents pay for the so-called hotel cost (food, 
drinks, newspapers, hygienic products, …) which is (on average) between 35 and 50 euros 
(daily).  
 
Child care in Flanders 
 
The child care delivery landscape is more complex than the elderly care sector, as it covers more 
different organisation types and labels, and as the demarcation between the sectors is not that 
clearly defined. The first characteristic of the delivery field is the difference between recognised 
and subsidised organisations on the one hand, and supervised but not subsidised organisations on 
the other hand. Organisations with a certificate of supervision (‘attest van toezicht’) are less 
heavily regulated with regards to personnel and infrastructural requirements, and can determine 
their own fees and admission criteria. Recognised and subsidised care providers are characterised 
by a large focus on quality and accessibility, and are obliged to ask  parents a fee that depends on 
the taxable income and the familiar situation (number and kind of children), varying from 0 to 25 
euro a day. The parental fees are complemented by governmental subsidies to finance staff and 
running costs.5  
 
The recognised and subsidised sector has a public or non profit character, but not all organisations 
with a certificate of supervision are commercial. As recognition is coupled to subsidies and as the 
                                                 
5
 Some organizations with a certificate of supervision can also get a subsidy per place if they fulfill some preconditions 
on competencies and opening hours. This kind of subsidy however can hardly be compared with the subsidies that 
subsidized care centers receive. The subsidy per place for day centers with a certificate of supervision is 
approximately 550 euro, the subsidy for its recognized equivalent is approximately 9000 euro per place. 
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budget for enlargement of the sector is scarce6, a lot of public and non-profit organisations that 
want to be recognised or could be recognised, set up their own care organisations, without 
Flemish subsidies. The second aspect that should be mentioned is the difference between 
residential care at the one hand and familiar type care in the house of the care provider at the 
other hand and that this difference exists as well in the subsidised (public or not for profit) as in 
the private forprofit sector. In the recognised and subsidised sector, familiar child care is 
organised by a family day care service who selects the baby minders and introduces them to 
parents.7 The third aspect worth mentioning has to do with the scale of the care providers. Every 
care provider has to respect the minimum or maximum capacity that is legally fixed by the 
Flemish Government: 
 
 Subsidised day care centres have to count at least 23 places, non-subsidised day care 
centres have to count at least 8 places.  
 A private family day care provider may take care for up to 7 children at the same time, 
family day care providers related to a family day care service may take care for up to 8 
children at the same time, but on average they may only care for 4 children per quarter. A 
family day care service is subsidized based on its capacity in places. In order to keep its 
subsidies, the service has to attract and maintain sufficient baby minders to provide its 
places in a fixed working area, mostly –but not always- limited by the borders of a local 
community. The capacities of family day care services differ tremendously as the smallest 
one has 49 places and the largest one has a capacity of 607 places. 
 
Table 2  gives an overview of the sizes of the different types of child care providers. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The recognition of new places depends on the availability of resources. It is the Flemish Government and the Minister 
of Welfare in particular who decides if and how many places can be subsidized. The recog-nition occurs by an 
enlargement operation in which public and non-profit care providers can apply for a number of places. The available 
places are spread out over the provinces based on parameters that try to estimate the need for child care, related to 
the existing supply of care facilities. Within every province, a ranking of communities is set up to allocate the places 
first in those communities with the highest needs. The ranking is made based on the combination of several demand 
and supply parameters, such as the number of young children with a working mother. The last enlargement period 
took place in 2005, at the moment a new enlargement is being held in which more than 1000 subsidized places will 
be allocated.   
7
 However, the people who take care of the children in their houses are not tied to the family day care service with an 
employment contract as they got a specific statute in the belgian social security system. 
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Subsidised Non-subsidised  Sector/ 
Places Subsidised day 
centres 
Subsidised family 
care services 
Non-Subsidised day 
centres 
Non-subsidised 
family care 
TOTAL 
Number of care 
providers 291 193
8
 977 1144 2567  
Number of 
places 13.439 30.679 18.456 6.859 
 44.118 (64%) 25.315 (36%) 
69.433 
Table 2: Number and size of the different child care providers 
 
At the end of 2007 there were 69.433 places in Flemish preschool9 child care.10 Approximately 
two-third (64%) of the places are subsidised. 54% of the places are of familiar care type, 46% are 
group care like. We know that early 2007, 83.600 children attended pre-school child care. A child 
care place thus is used on average by 1,2 children11. As we know that there were 195.000 children 
younger then 3 years, approximately 43% of Flemish young children make use of formal child 
care services. Allthough the use of formal care is rather high, informal child care (e.g. 
grandparents) thus maintains to be the dominant care type for young children. The Flemish 
Government delegates the competency of child care to a public agency named Kind en Gezin 
(Child and Family). Kind en Gezin is responsible for organising and monitoring formal pre-
school and out-of-school care.12 Kind en Gezin does not deliver any care service itself, it only 
regulates, subsidizes and controls. All formal child care must be registered to Kind en Gezin. A 
recognition or certificate of supervision is important for the working parents as only costs for 
recognised or supervised child care can generate fiscal benefits. 
 
Sectoral prevalences in child and elderly care at the Flemish level 
 
After having sketched the demand and supply side in both policy areas, we will now compare the 
sectoral prevalences in both areas.  We only look at the prevalences in terms of places and will 
not look at prevalences in terms of residences or organisations, as the minimal size of care 
providers differs a lot between both policy areas.13  
 
                                                 
8
 More then 5000 baby minders are affiliated to these 193 services. If we would count them like private family care 
providers, the total number of care providers would exceed 7000 providers.  
9
 An unknown amount of places will be taken by children older than 3, as private day care providers may also take care 
of children up to 6 years. 
10
 Per 100 children under 3 year there are approximately 35,3 places, which is more than the European target figure of 
33 places per 100 children under 3 years. 
11
 Not every child has a continuously need for formal child care, as some parents or grand parents can take care for one 
or more days a week. 
12
 Besides its child care competencies, Kind en Gezin is also responsible for the preventive medical and educational 
support for families with young children.  
13
 Child care providers can be a lot smaller then elderly care residences. 
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Table 3 contains comparative data on the sectoral prevalences in both policy areas. 
 
ELDERLY CARE CHILD CARE Supply capacity 
(in places) Residential 
home 
% Subsidised 
day centres 
Subsidised 
family care 
Non-
Subsidised 
day centres 
Non-
subsidised 
family care 
Total 
 
% 
Public 23.923 38% 8.958 21.766 3.913   34.637 21% 
Non-profit 34.423 54% 4.481 8.913 1.153   14.547 50% 
Profit 
(Commercial) 
7.036 11%     13.390 6.859 
20.249 
29% 
Total 63.382  13.439 30.679 18.456 6.859 69.433  
Table 3: Sectoral prevalence in both policy areas  
 
Table 3 confirms the assumption that all three sectors are important actors in delivering care 
facilities. In the area of elderly care, there is one sector that is rather small, as the profit sector 
represents only 11% of the total amount of places. In child care all three sectors represent more 
than 20% of the total capacity.  In both policy areas, the non-profit sector has the largest share in 
total capacity. The Flemish welfare policy, and more specific elderly care and child care, is thus a 
typical example of co-production of service delivery between different sectors (nonprofit, public, 
and to a lesser extent commercial). In child care, the nonprofit sector represents half of the places, 
in elderly care it even exceeds 50%. Remarkable is the observation that in elderly care the public 
sector is more important than the commercial sector. In child care the opposite can be concluded, 
but the size differences are not as large as in the elderly sector. This could be explained by two 
facts. First of all, starting a commercial initiative may be easier in child care than in elderly 
care.14 Secondly, the fact that there  exist some subsidies for commercial day centres may attract 
entrepeneurs to invest more in child care than in elderly care. Table 3 also shows that most of the 
non-profit capacity is subsidized15, implying that the Flemish welfare field is a typical example of 
a governmentally subsidized field in which the non-profit sector is mainly a government-
dominant funded sector, in a rather corporatist society characterized by large governmental social 
spending and a large nonprofit sector (Anheier 2006, Salamon & Anheier 1998). As the amount 
of places in both policy areas is large enough and as all sectors take an important share of the 
total capacity in both fields, we now are capable to make a reliable analysis of sectoral 
prevalences at the local level.  
 
 
                                                 
14
 The requirements with regards to personnel and infrastructure seem to be less heavy in child care than in elderly care. 
Moreover, the minimal capacity to start a profitable initiative is smaller in child care than in elderly care. 
15
 In child care only 11% of the non-profit places is not subsidized. In the public sector only 8% of the places are not 
subsidized.  
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2. SERVICE DELIVERY IN ELDERLY AND CHILD CARE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
 
Absolute figures about (variation in) elderly and child care service delivery 
 
 In Flanders, there are 308 local communities, which are the units of analysis in this 
paper.16 Table 4 describes the existing variation between these communities with regard 
to the number of residences/child care providers and the number of places in each sector. 
We distinguish between public, private nonprofit and private forprofit (commercial) care 
facilities per local community. 
 
ELDERLY CARE CHILD CARE 
 Mean Min Max  Mean Min Max 
Total residences 2005 2,42 0 49 Total providers 2007 8,45 0 177 
Public residences  0,78 0 18 Public providers 0,7 0 37 
Nonprofit residences  1,18 0 24 Non-profit 1,54 0 40 
Commercial residences ,46 0 7 Commercial 6,2 0 100 
Total places residences 2005 199,45 0 5251 Total places 2007 225 0 4494 
Places in public sector 77,65 0 2806 Places in public sector 47,19 0 1535 
Places in non-profit sector 98,46 0 1988 Places in non-profit sector 112,46 0 2065 
Places in commercial sector 23,34 0 706 Places in commercial sector 65,79 0 1137 
Table 4: Supply of elderly and child care in Flemish local communities (N=308) 
 
With regard to the number of care providers, both policy areas differ a lot due to scale differences 
in minimal capacities. On average, a Flemish community counts 2,4217 residential homes and 
8,45 child care providers. This variability difference between both areas is confirmed by 
differences in the maximum number of care providers, as the maximum number in child care 
(N=177) exceeds largely the maximum in elderly care (N=49), mainly caused by a large number 
of small commercial familiar care initiatives in child care. Looking at the minima in table 4, we 
can conclude that that the coverage of welfare services in Flanders is not perfectly, as in both 
policy areas the minimum in care providers is 0, what means that there is at least 1 community 
without elderly and/or child care services. The sectoral minima indicate moreover that no sector 
is present in all 308 local communities. In the following paragraph, we will describe this sectoral 
variability in depth.  
                                                 
16
 For a good understanding of this paragraph it is useful to keep in mind that there exist huge differences between 
these units of analysis as big cities as Antwerp or Ghent are compared to smaller cities or very small local 
communities. 
17
 Most of the communities however have only 1 (40%) or 2 residences (27%).  
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The total number of places in residential homes varies from 0 to 5251 (in Antwerp). On average, 
in Flemish local communities, there are 199 places in residential homes. In child care, the 
maximum number of places is 4494, but on average there are 225 places in a community. 
 
Relative distribution of public, private nonprofit and private for profit supply 
 
Table 5 contains information about the extent whether service provision is absent in a local 
community, whether there is ‘hegemonic’ service delivery, or whether there is ‘co-production’ 
between sectors in local communities. By the label hegemonic we refer to the situation in which 
all service delivery in a local community is delivered by only one sector. By the label co-
production we refer to those local communities in which more than one sector supplies services.  
 
 ELDERLY CARE 
(N of local communities) 
CHILD CARE 
(N of local communities) 
No supply at all 20 18 
Hegemonic supply 162 
- 51 (public hegemony) 
- 91 (nonprofit hegemony) 
- 20 (commercial hegemony) 
90 
- 1 (public hegemony) 
- 14 (nonprofit hegemony) 
- 75 (commercial hegemony) 
Co-production 126 200 
Total 308 308 
Table 5: Relative distribution of places in elderly and child care organizations in the three sectors 
 
In 20 local communities (5,5%) there are no residential homes, while 18 communities have to 
deal with a lack of child care services. In elderly care, the public sector is hegemonic in 51 local 
communities, the nonprofit sector is hegemonic in 91 local communities and the commercial 
sector is the only service provider in 20 local communities. In child care, we observe hegemonic 
situations in 1 (public sector), 14 (nonprofit sector) and 75 (commercial sector) local 
communities.  
 
The data thus show that there are more ‘hegemonic’ situations in elderly care than in child care 
(162 versus 90), which is mainly caused by the fact that the scale of a residential home often 
leaves few space left for residences of other sectors in that local community. This implies that 
there are far more situations of co-production in child care than in elderly care. In 200 
communities at least two sectors are present in child care18, in elderly care this occurs in 131 
                                                 
18
 There are even 63 communities in which all three sectors are active. In the 137 other communities with child care 
facilities, there was always one sector missing, mostly the public one (92 communities without public supply, 38 
communities without non-profit, 7 communities without profit supply). 
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communities. In these local communities, we have a situation of so-called co-production of 
welfare services between two or three sectors. Also, we can observe that the dominance patterns 
do not correspond between the policy areas. Allthough the non-profit sector was the largest sector 
in both policy areas, in elderly care a lot more non-profit hegemonies can be observed than in 
child care (91 versus 14). In child care most hegemonic situations are commercial (75). The 
difference in public hegemonies is even larger. While there is only one community where all 
child care supply is public, there are 51 public hegemonic cases in elderly care. These numbers 
show that there is a large variation in the prevalence of the three sector’ s service delivery among 
the 308 Flemish local communities. This observation brings us to the next part of the paper, in 
which we will try to explain this variation of the sectoral prevalence. However, the observed 
differences in sectoral prevalence (largely caused by differences in the size of care initiatives) 
should be kept in mind as they may interfer with our ambition to test cross-validate theory based 
assumptions in two policy areas. Explaining non-profit prevalence in elderly care seems to be a 
matter of explaining non profit hegemony or non-profit absence, while the explaining of non-
profit prevalence in child care is more a relative matter. 
 
3. EXPLAINING THE PREVALENCE OF SECTORS IN ELDERLY AND CHILD CARE 
 
In search for theoretical explanations 
 
Three sets of hypothetical explanations for the extent to which public and private organizations 
(non-profit, for-profit) are engaged in welfare service delivery can be derived from a large 
literature on theorizing the nonprofit sector, that has been eloquently described by Anheier (2006, 
see also Anheier and Ben-Ner 2003, Grönbjerg & Paarlberg 2001). These hypothetical 
explanations can be linked to (a) demand-side factors, (b) supply-side factors and (c) the specific 
situation in a local community.  
 
a) Demand-side explanations 
 
The first theoretical direction looks at the demand for welfare provision. According to this line of 
reasoning, supply of elderly and child care will be organized in those local communities where 
there is a  demand that is large enough. It seems obvious to claim that in local communities where 
there are relatively more elderly people or little children, there will also be more care supply. 
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However, this assumption cannot explain which sector (public, nonprofit, forprofit) will supply 
the services in case of large demand. Therefore, we need other demand-side factors in a 
theoretical model. The concept of demand heterogeneity may be a valuable starting point 
(Weisbrod 1988, Anheier 2006). Demand heterogeneity is the extent to which the demand for 
quality and quantity of service delivery in a society is heterogenous or not. Public goods theory 
assumes that the public goods and services provided by the public sector will always have the 
quality and quantity as demanded/desired by the largest segment in the population (the so-called 
“median-voter”), because serving this largest segment of the population is electorally spoken 
most valuable for public officials. The marginal (electoral) gains of delivering services to 
minority groups outside the median-voter segment are too small for public officials. This means 
that some segments of the population are left unserved or insufficiently served, because these 
segments demand other levels of quality and/or quantity than the services provided by the public 
authority. In societies that are characterized by a large demand heterogeneity, these unserved 
demands will be large. Hence, in a heterogenous society, private supply will be larger, compared 
to public supply (private sector fills large gaps that are left by public sector supply). Ceteris 
paribus, in a society that is characterized by homogeneity, public supply will be larger, compared 
to private supply (public sector can address large groups of the electorate with a supply that will 
satisfy the demands of this large group). Whether private sector supply will be nonprofit or 
forprofit, will depend on the nature of the demander. We can argue that market failure 
mechanisms will prevent forprofit providers to deliver services to those demanders that are rather 
distressed or less well-of, because there is few profit-making chances in this segment of the 
population. Forprofit suppliers tend to invest in markets where the chances for profit-making or 
growing are larger. Hence, we could hypothesize that private for profit initiatives will prevail in 
communities with elderly people or young families that are relatively spoken better off 
(financially). Related to the demand-heterogeneity thesis, we could argue that the forprofit sector 
will tend to supply those segments of the society that demand for higher levels of supply than 
provided by the public sector (e.g. in terms of quantity and quality). On the other hand, nonprofit 
providers can be assumed to fill the gaps at the other end of the societal spectrum, by addressing 
demands of people that are left unserved by private forprofit suppliers (market failure) and by 
public sector suppliers. If this assumption is correct, we will observe more private nonprofit 
initiatives in local communities with a population that is relatively spoken more distressed or less 
well-off. 
 
b) Supply-side explanations 
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The second theoretical direction looks at the supply of welfare services. Demand alone is not 
enough as an explanation, one also needs suppliers, or people or sectors that are willing to invest 
in providing welfare services. A lot of literature has been published already on the social 
entrepreneur, explaining why people or what kind of people start nonprofit initiatives. Corbin 
(1999), Booth et al (1989) and Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen (1991) all found that in communities 
that are relatively wealthy, there is a large private non-profit (and in some cases also profit) 
sector. Also the existence of human resources in a local community (e.g. socio-economic status, 
education-levels, or age) may contribute positively to the size of the nonprofit sector (Galper 
1999, Lincoln 1977, Guterbock & Fries 1997). These features point at a potential existence of 
entrepreneurs, which may be a prerequisite for a strong private sector (James 1987, Rose-
Ackerman 1996, Young 1983). So we can argue that in a local community that is characterized by 
an averagely wealthy, well-educated and middle-aged population, there will be a large private 
welfare sector, because conditions for entrepreneurship are good. The question whether this 
entrepreneurship will be rather ‘social’  or ‘economical’ , can be linked to some of the demand-
side factors discussed above. We can distinguish between social and economic entrepreneurs. 
Concerning social entrepreneurs, Wolch & Geiger (1983) hypothesized that in a local community, 
affluent community members may have the incentive to invest (resources, talent, …) in nonprofit 
initiative that serve particular target groups that are in need for services. Thus one can assume 
that in communities with a lot of economic distress, social entrepreneurs that are driven by 
altruistic motives will tend to invest their resources and talents in private nonprit initiatives. A 
variation on the theme of the social entrepreneur, that mainly explains the existence of private 
nonprofit organisations from a social motive, is the economic entrepreneur. One can argue that 
also entrepreneurs driven by an economic motive may be attracted to deliver some welfare 
services in order to make some (monetary) profit. Economic entrepreneurs will take action when 
the conditions for profit making action are good. This may be the case in the situation where the 
demand by people that are relatively well-of is large (e.g. large number of elderly people that are 
relatively wealthy). Next to human resources as crucial supply factor, there are also financial 
resources. Firstly, there is already evidence that in wealthier communities there is a larger 
nonprofit and forprofit sector (Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen 1992). This could be explained (cf. 
supra) by the fact that in these communities private funding and donations may be higher. But, in 
the case of elderly care in Flanders most of the funds of service providers are governmental 
subsidies (to a lesser extent this applies to private for profits in elderly care in Flanders, cf. supra).  
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According to the so-called interdependence theory (Salamon 1987) a (financial) partnership 
between government and nonprofit sector grows, in which governmental weaknesses are 
compensated by nonprofit strengths and vice versa. In such partnerships, nonprofits perform 
public tasks on behalf of government, and receive governmental funding in turn. This is also the 
case in Flanders, where dense public and nonprofit sectoral activity in elderly care can be 
explained by the fact that central government provides many financial resources to both sectors. 
This central governmental funding does not suffice for explaining differences in prevalence of 
sectors between local communities. Therefore, we can look at local governmental spending for 
social and welfare purposes (local government is the governmental tier on which services in 
elderly care are delivered). In the case where there is a lot of local governmental welfare funding, 
we might expect  a larger public sector in providing elderly care services, compared to the private 
sector. This may potentially lead to a crowding out effect, by which a lot of welfare service 
supply by the public sector hardly leaves space for supply by other sectors (because the demand 
for services to a large extent is already supplied by the public setor). Hence, a strong public sector 
crowds out other (private) sectors. 
 
c) ‘Social origins’  explanations 
 
A third set of explanations is less instrumental than the demand- and supply-explanations. Social 
origins theory (Salamon & Anheier 1998, Anheier 2006) explains the prevalence of different 
sectors in public service delivery as the result of economic, social and political factors that shape 
the sector and what the sector looks like. Relying largely on the concept of path-dependence, 
some factors are identified that explain the size and composition of the nonprofit sector. Although 
the theory was initially developed by Salamon and Anheier for explaining size and composition 
of the nonprofit sector cross-nationally, it might also be useful to test some of the social origins 
arguments in the case of elderly and child care supply on the local governmental level in 
Flanders. As Flanders is a prototype of a pillarized society in which ideological organisations 
were/are strongly tied to specific political parties, electoral success of political parties at the local 
level in particular may be an important  factor for explaining sectoral prevalences. Ideologically, 
we could link the non-profit sector to the christian-democrat party (historically supporting private 
initiatives by religious congregations), the public sector can be linked to the socialist party 
(supporting public collectivistic service delivery), while the commercial sector is tied to the 
liberal party (supporting market solutions and private initiative for welfare service delivery). 
Hence, according to a social origins explanation, we may assume that the strength of a certain 
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sector (public, nonprofit, commercial) in a local community may depend on the dominant 
political ideology in that local community.  
 
Overview of hypotheses  
 
The theoretical discussion we described above results in following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: In local communities with a heterogenous population, heterogenous demand will be 
addressed predominantly by private sector suppliers (governmental failure argument). In local 
communities with a homogenous population, homogenous demand will be addressed by public 
sector supply (median-voter argument).  
 
Hypothesis 2: In local communities with a population that is relatively spoken well-off in 
financial terms, we will observe a large forprofit sector. In local communities with a population 
that is characterized by higher levels of social distress, we will observe a larger private nonprofit 
sector (market-failure argument).  
 
Hypothesis 3: In local communities with a population that is wealthy, well-educated and has a 
large segment of middle-aged people, there will be fertile conditions for entrepreneurship, from 
which a large private sector can emerge (entrepreneurship argument). 
 
Hypothesis 4: In local communities with a lot of local governmental welfare and social spending, 
there will be a larger public sector in elderly and child care provision, compared to the private 
sector (financial supply argument). 
 
Hypothesis 5: The prevalence of different sectors in welfare service delivery depends on the 
dominant political ideology in a local community (social origins argument). In local communities 
in which the christian-democrat party has a relative large share of seats in the municipality 
council, the non-profit sector will be larger. In local communities with a strong social-democrat 
party, the public sector will be dominant. In local communities with a strong liberal party, the 
commercial sector will be stronger. 
 
Method 
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For testing the hypotheses formulated above, we will perform linear regression analysis with care 
facilities (in terms of places) as dependent variables, and demand-, supply-, and social origins 
factors as independent variables. The data we rely on for measuring the dependent and 
independent variables are taken from various databases (see annex 1). For all analyses, cases 
(local communities) in which elderly care residences or child care providers are absent, are 
ommitted. These cases are ommitted, because we want to test the relative prevalence of the three 
sectors in welfare service delivery, rather than the absolute prevalence. This results in an N of 288 
local communities (residential homes) and 290 local communities (in child care).  
 
Measurement of the dependent variables 
 
The relative number of places in residential elderly care and child care facilities per local 
community are the dependent variables. This is the number of places in (a) public, (b) private 
nonprofit and (c) private commercial residential homes or child care initiatives, divided by the 
total number of places in residential homes or child care initiatives in the local community. Each 
local community thus receives a score for the relative prevalence of places in elderly and child 
care facilities for three sectors (public/nonprofit/commercial). This score ranges from 0 to 1.19  
 
Measurement of the independent variables 
 
The demand heterogeneity is measured by looking at the span of income. This is a measure of 
income heterogeneity and represents the difference (in euros) between the third and the first 
quartile (interquartile difference). A large interquartile difference suggest a large span of income, 
hence large income heterogeneity. A second demand variable is the number of distressed people. 
This variable is operationalised differently in both policy areas. In elderly care, it can be 
measured by looking at the number of elderly people that receives the minimal guaranteed 
income20 per 1000 people of 65+. In child care, it can be measured by looking at the number of 
births in underpriviliged families21 related to the total number of births. As to supply-side 
variables, we look at some measures that give an indication of the potential entrepreneurship in 
                                                 
19
 For example, if for a local community with in total 12 places in residential homes 6 places are public, 4 places are 
nonprofit, and 2 places are commercial, then the relative scores are: places in public residential homes .50 (6/12), 
places in nonprofit residential homes .33 (4/12), and places in commercial residential homes .16 (2/12). 
20
 This is the lowest income possible not to be officially in poverty. 
21
 This figure depends on subjective interpretations of family situations by nurses working for Kind en Gezin. Every 
family is being judged on 6 criteria (income, educational level of parents, working situation, living conditions, health 
care and level of educational stimulation). When a family gets a negative score on three of these criteria, the child is 
being considered as underprivileged. 
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the local community. First, the mean income that was declared to the fiscal authorities in a local 
community. Second, the percentage of people in the age category of 40-59 years. Third, the 
number of low educated people that are unemployed (per 1000 inhabitants). These measures are 
used, as previous research has shown that (social) entrepreneurship is more likely to be observed 
with middle-aged people that are relatively well-off (financially) and have had a higher education 
(e.g. Galper 1999). As a final supply indicator, we look at local governmental spending for social 
and welfare funding, by measuring the number of euros the local government spends per capita to 
the public centre of social welfare (the public local institure for welfare). For the social origins 
indicators, we use the political ideology of a local community as an independent variable. 
Therefore we use the electoral success of three political parties (christian-democrat CD&V, 
social-democrat SP.a, and liberal VLD) in the elections for the local council in 1976 and 2000. 
We have constructed an index that reflects the mean electoral score of these parties for both 
election-years. By using an index that covers electoral scores over 25 years, we hope to be able to 
capture some aspects of dominant and persistent political ideologies in local communities, rather 
than election-results (that are no more than a snapshot at one moment in time).  
 
Empirical results 
 
Before we present the results of the linear regression analysis, we first take a look at the 
correlation analysis of the dependent variables (table 6).  
 
 
Nonprofit 
supply child 
care 
(relative) 
Public 
supply 
child care 
(relative) 
Commercial 
supply child 
care (relative) 
Nonprofit 
supply 
elderly care 
(relative) 
Public 
supply 
elderly care 
(relative) 
Commercial 
supply elderly 
care (relative) 
Nonprofit supply 
child care (relative) 1 -,333(**) -,592(**) -,028 ,091 -,083 
Public supply child 
care (relative)  1 -,311(**) -,064 ,015 ,073 
Commercial supply 
child care (relative)   1 ,087 -,028 -,089 
Nonprofit supply 
elderly care (relative)    1 -,753(**) -,436(**) 
Public supply elderly 
care (relative)     1 -,264(**) 
Commercial supply 
elderly care (relative)      1 
Table 6: Correlation-analysis (Pearson) between the dependent variables (Sig: ** 0.01 level). 
 
 
Two important observations can be made. Firstly, there is no significant correlation between child 
care supply and elderly care supply (correlation coefficients in bold). This suggests that sectoral 
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prevalences in both elderly and child care are not necessarily the same in Flemish local 
communities. For example, a local community with a large relative nonprofit supply in elderly 
care, not necessarily also has a strong nonprofit supply in child care. Secondly, we observe 
significant negative correlations between sectoral supply in elderly care and in child care 
(correlation coefficients in italic). This means that within both policy areas of elderly and child 
care, there seems to be a kind of crowding-out effect between sectors. In other words, in local 
communities where one sector is dominant (e.g. the public sector), the other two sectors (e.g. 
nonprofit and commercial) are less involved in the service delivery in that local community.  
 
Independents Prediction Public Supply (relative) 
Nonprofit 
supply 
(relative) 
Commercial 
supply 
(relative) 
  Elderly 
care 
Child 
care 
Elderly 
care 
Child 
care 
Elderly 
care 
Child 
care 
DEMAND        
Span of income (2004) - (public)  
+ (private) -.12** .05 .06 -.01 .08 .03 
Distressed +65 / 1000 people of 
+65 (2006) .01  .09  -.14**  
Distressed children 
 
+ (nonprofit)  
- (profit) 
 .04  .21***  -.24*** 
R²  
 
.02 .00 .01 .05 .03 .05 
F  
 
2.28 .35 1.17 6.92 4.72 8.19 
Sig.  
 
.10 .70 .31 .00 .01 .00 
SUPPLY     
Mean income (2003) + (private) 
 
-.04 .08 -.06 -.03 .14* -.03 
Percent age 40-59 (2005) + (private) 
 
-.09 .10 .02 .09 .09 -.16*** 
Low educated unemployed / 
1000 inh. (2006) 
- (private) 
.04 .07 -.07 .20** .05 -.26*** 
Local govt. welfare spending per 
1 inh. (2005) 
+ (public) 
- (private) .37*** .17*** -.31*** .09 -.05 -.21*** 
R²  
 
.17 .05 .11 .07 .03 .15 
F  
 
14,029 3,77 8.83 4.99 2.42 12,29 
Sig.  
 
.000 .00 .00 .00 .05 .00 
SOCIAL ORIGINS     
SP + (public) 
.15 -.04 -.10 .08 -.07 -.07 
CVP + (nonprofit) 
.06 -.17 .-.04 .12 -.02 -.03 
VLD + (commercial) 
-.11 -.10 .14 -.20 -.05 -.36*** 
R²  
 
.04 .02 .04 .07 .00 .14 
F  
 
1.17 .64 .990 2,06 .11 4,27 
Sig.  
 
.33 .59 .40 .11 .96 .01 
Table 7: Summary of the linear regression analysis, standardized Beta-coefficients (Sig.: *** .01 / ** .05 / * .10) 
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In the table 7 the results of the linear regressions are presented. Three theoretical models for 
explaining the sectoral prevalence in elderly care and child care are tested. The demand-side 
model seems to be a weak explanation for the sectoral differences in supplying welfare services. 
For the dependent variables (supply in child and elderly care) the R² is low, ranging from .00 to 
.05. Some variables do have some explanatory power however. The level of distress in the local 
community (distressed children and distressed 65+) is related negatively to the level of 
commercial elderly care and child care provision, suggesting that this sector is less prevalent in 
supplying welfare services in local communities that are characterized by a relatively large level 
of distress (as it was assumed theoretically). This is an important observation, with potentially 
important policy-relevant implications. We could question, with extreme caution, whether in a 
marketized welfare sector dominated by commercial supply, all socio-economic segments of 
society will be reached. Secondly, in local communities with a relatively large number of 
distressed children, the supply of nonprofit child care provision is relatively larger. An 
explanation for this observation is that the number of distressed children is one parameter for 
distributing central governmental subsidies in child care. It could thus be the case that nonprofit 
providers in local communities with a lot of distressed children have better chances to receive 
governmental subsidies (and that explains their larger prevalence in those communities). Social 
distress is, however, not related to nonprofit elderly care supply. One explanation could be that 
the public sector also focuses on the group of (relatively) distressed elderly people. Thirdly, also 
in line with our theoretical assumptions, we observe that the lower the span of income, the higher 
the level of public sector supply (but only for elderly care).   
 
The supply-side model offers a better explanation for the sectoral differences in supplying 
elderly care services. 17% of the variance in public supply of elderly care (R²=.17), 11% of the 
variance in private non profit elderly care supply (R²=.11), and 15% of the variation in 
commercial child care supply can be explained by the supply-side variables. Especially the extent 
to which local governments spend resources to welfare programs is a strong predictor. As 
hypothesized, there is a positive and significant relationship between local governmental welfare 
spending and public supply (both in child and elderly care). Next to that, also in line with our 
hypotheses, ther is a negative and significant relationship between local governmental welfare 
spending on the one hand, and private non profit elderly care supply and commercial child care 
supply on the other hand. Of course this finding is quite obvious, as local public welfare services 
are managed by the local public authorities. Hence, in local authorities with a lot of public supply, 
and subsequent poor private supply of welfare services, we may observe the so-called crowding-
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out effect (cf. supra) by which one sector (in this case the public sector) dominates the field at the 
expense of the other sectors. The variables of entrepreneurship yield some contradictory results 
however. We hypothesized that in local communities with a population that are rather wealthy, 
have a lot of people in their middle-ages, and have a population with higher levels of education, 
private sector welfare services supply may be higher. The empirical results show that mean 
income is positively related to commercial elderly care provision, and that in local communities 
with fewer low educated unemployed people the commercial child care provision is relatively 
higher (as hypothesized). This observation might be explained by the fact that establishing and 
managing a child care facility requires a lot of managerial skills (pricing, HR management, 
quality management etc). On the other hand, and contrary to what we have hypothesized, the 
fewer people in their middle ages, the more commercial child care provision exists, and the more 
people that are unemployed and poorly educated, the more nonprofit child care provision we 
observe. The latter observation may be the result of the potential dominance of demand-related 
factors: in local communities where a lot of unemployed and poorly educated people live, the 
demand for income-related child care (the amount of the fee for care depends on one’ s income) 
may be higher, hence the positive relationship between the level of unemployment with nonprofit 
child care supply.    
 
Thirdly, the social origins model also offers a poor explanation for the sectoral differences in 
supplying welfare services. Only for explaining the commercial child care provision, this model 
is significant (.00, R²=.14). It is however contrary to what we have hypothesized, as we observe a 
negative relationship between local communities with a strong liberal political ideology and 
commercial child care provision. No significant relationships between welfare provision and 
christian-democrat and social-democrat ideologies can be found. Perhaps, this empirically 
unexisting relationship can be explained as the result of the difficulty for local governments to 
provide welfare services themselves, especially in a sector that is characterized by strong central 
governmental steering and control. For example, in elderly care there is the so-called 
‘programmation-norm’ . According to this norm, in a local community only a certain number of 
places in residences are subsidized by the central government (1 place per 100 people between 
60-74, 4 places per 100 people between 75-79, 12 places per 100 people 80-84, etc.). This policy 
results in a situation that only in those local communities where current elderly care supply not 
meets the norm, there is still room for new initiatives. Potential (public or private) suppliers are 
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thus dependent on the local situation to be able to invest in supply or not.22 A second kind of 
policy is that central governmental issues very strict quality norms (care, kitchen, safety, …). This 
means that the starting-up costs for new residences are very high because of necessary 
investments to meet these norms. To a certain extent, these policies by central government lead to 
a more or less stable public-private distribution: new initiatives are only possible in local 
communities where the norm is not reached yet, and it is easier to adapt existing infrastructure to 
the (ever increasing) quality norms, than to invest in new and very expensive infrastructure. 
Hence, factors like central governmental policy (programmation- and quality-norms) may 
determine the supply of welfare services at the local level, rather than the local political 
(ideological) constellation.   
 
CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION 
 
Elderly care and child care in Flanders are provided at the level of the local community in 
Flanders. Care facilities may be organized by three sectors: public, private nonprofit and 
commercial. Hence, we can say that in both policy areas, a typical situation of co-production of 
welfare services between different sectors may exist. The figures in table 3 (supra) show that the 
three sectors have a share in service provision. Public facilities account for 38% of the elderly 
care and for 21% of the child care in Flanders. Nonprofit facilities account for 54% of the elderly 
care and 50% of the child care in Flanders. And commercial facilities account for 11% of the 
elderly, and 29% of the child care in Flanders. The large share of the subsidized nonprofit sector 
in both policy areas is exemplary for the fact that Flanders (Belgium) is a country that has a 
corporatist society with a large governmental social spending and a large nonprofit sector. We 
also observed large differences between local communities as to sectoral prevalence in both 
policy areas. Table 5 (supra) shows that in elderly care, in 162 local communities only one of the 
three sectors supplies services. In child care, there are 90 hegemonic local communities, where 
service supply is offered by only one sector (public or nonprofit or commercial). In the rest of the 
local communities with elderly care and child care provision, two or three sectors are present in 
the provision of welfare services (public and/or nonprofit and/or commercial). In these local 
communities, we have a situation of co-production of welfare services between sectors at the 
                                                 
22
 In child care there does not exist a formal kind of programmation norm, but the fact that scarce Flemish 
child care subsidies are allocated based on rankings of communities within every province,  it is clear that 
communities beneath the ranking hardly make any chance to get subsidies. 
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local governmental level (200 local communities in child care, 131 local communities in elderly 
care). Only few local communities have no child care supply (18) or elderly care supply (15).  
 
In search for an explanation of these differences in sectoral prevalence between local 
communities, we developed hypotheses that are linked to three different theoretical models 
(demand, supply and social origins). Statistical analysis shows that these models at best can only 
be partially supported. The supply-side model offers the strongest explanation for variation in 
sectoral prevalence in elderly and child care. Still, some variables have some significant 
explanatory power. We found for example that the span of income in a local community is 
negatively related to the public sector welfare service provision. This is in line with our 
hypothesis that assumed that in local communities with a homogeneous demand, the public 
service delivery will prevail over private sector service delivery (median voter argument, see 
hypotheses). The level of social distress is also a strong explanatory variable. In line with our 
hypotheses, we found that commercial service delivery will be stronger in local community that 
are rather distressed. In local communities with a population that is relatively more distressed, 
nonprofit supply will prevail (market failure argument). This observation may have some 
important policy-relevant implications. Also the level of potential entrepreneurship in a local 
community may explain sectoral prevalences in welfare service provision. The higher the average 
income in the local community, the more commercial welfare service delivery. The lower the 
percentage of low educated unemployed people, the more commercial initiatives. The higher the 
percentage of low educated unemployed people, the more private nonprofit initiatives. These 
findings, however, seem to be in line with the demand-side theoretical arguments, rather than 
with the supply-side theoretical arguments. Variables such as mean income, and low educated 
unemployed people may tell us more about the demand for services, than about the supply of 
services. If we consider these variables as demand-side variables instead of supply-side variables, 
the theoretical model of demand may gain in strenght.  
 
One final important variable for explaining sectoral prevalence is the extent to which the local 
government spends for welfare service delivery. This variable is positively related to public 
supply, and negatively related to nonprofit and commercial supply. As already said supra, this 
may be one explanation for the observed crowding-out effect (see table 6 supra). The more the 
local government spends for delivering public welfare services, the less room for other (private) 
initiatives to deliver services in that local community, because a large part of the demand for 
welfare services is already addressed by the local government. This crowding-out effect may even 
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be strenghtened by central governmental policies. In elderly care for example, there exist 
programmation-norms and quality norms. These norms prevent extra supply in local communities 
where the programmation-norm is already reached (the maximum number of places that can be 
subsidized by the central government is reached already). This decreases the opportunities for 
other suppliers to enter the local market. Central government policy may thus be a stronger 
predictor for sectoral prevalence than more instrumental explanations. In countries like Flanders, 
that are characterized by a large nonprofit sector besides a large public sector, and where 
nonprofits are heavily subsidized by government, we may need other explanations for nonprofit 
sector prevalence compared to countries where the nonprofit sector is mainly funded by fees and 
donations (fee-dominant countries, Anheier 2006). In Flanders, both public sector and nonprofit 
sector serve the same target group with the same (governmental) means. In other countries that 
are more fee-oriented in nature, demand heterogeneity theory may be more relevant (nonprofits as 
complementary gap-fillers for delivering services to target groups that are not served by public 
sector service supply). In government-dominant countries where nonprofits receive a lot of public 
money, explanations for whether the public or the nonprofit setor will prevail, will thus depend 
on some specific (local) contextual characteristics (e.g. relationship between local governmental 
welfare spending and the prevalance of public and nonprofit welfare service suppliers). 
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Annex 1: variables, measurement and data-source 
VARIABLE MEASUREMENT SOURCE 
Dependent elderly care   
Public supply (relative) Places in public residential homes per total number of places(2005) 
www.wvc.vlaanderen.be/ouderenzorg/ 
Private non-profit supply (relative) Places in private nonprofit residential homes per total number of places(2005) 
www.wvc.vlaanderen.be/ouderenzorg/ 
Private for profit supply (relative) 
Places in private forprofit residential 
homes per total number of places 
(2005) 
www.wvc.vlaanderen.be/ouderenzorg/ 
Dependent child care   
Public supply (relative) 
Places in public recognised day centres 
/ family care services and public day 
centres with a certificate of supervision 
(2007) 
Data file offered by Kind en Gezin 
Private non-profit supply (relative) 
Places in non-profit recognised day 
centres / family care services and  non 
profit day centres with a certificate of 
supervision (2007)) 
Data file offered by Kind en Gezin 
Private for profit supply (relative) Places in private forprofit day centres 
or private family care providers (2007) 
Data file offered by Kind en Gezin 
Independent   
Span of income  Interquartile difference income 
(difference between first and third 
quartile) (2004) 
APS – lokale statistieken 
Distressed +65 / 1000 people +65 Number of people older than 65 that 
receive minimum income/pension 
(2006) 
APS – lokale statistieken 
Distressed children Number of births in underprivileged 
families / total number of births 
(average of 3 years: 2004-2006) 
APS – Lokale statistieken 
Mean income  Mean income (2003)  APS – lokale statistieken 
Percent age 40-59  Percent of people in age category 40-59 
(2005) 
APS – lokale statistieken 
Low educated unemployed / 1000 
inh.  
Number of unemployed people with 
low education per 1000 inhabitants 
(2006) 
APS – lokale statistieken 
Local govt. welfare spending per 1 
inh.  
Number of euros per inhabitant local 
government spends to public centre for 
social welfare (2005) 
ABA jaarbeeld 2005 
Political ideology Christian-
democrat 
Mean election-results local elections 
1976 and 2000 
Database from VUB 
Political ideology social-democrat Mean election-results local elections 
1976 and 2000 
Database from VUB 
Political ideology liberal Mean election-results local elections 
1976 and 2000 
Database from VUB 
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ANNEX 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Independent variables N Mean Min Max Std.Dev. 
Span of income (2004) 308 21068 12880 33049 3436 
Distressed +65 / total number of +65 308 ,05 
,01 ,12 ,02 DEMAND-
MODEL N births in underprivileged families / total N 
births 
308 0,06 0,00 0,21 0,03 
Mean income (2003) 308 25725 19509 37602 3122 
Percent age 40-59 (2005) 308 28,80 23,68 38,37 1,67 
Low educated unemployed / 1000 inh. (2006) 308 14,77 4,11 39,24 6,04 
SUPPLY-
MODEL 
Local govt. welfare spending per 1 inh. (2005) 308 83,87 ,000 218,76 36,92 
SOCIAL  SP.a (social-democrat) 196 ,17 ,00 ,53 ,12 
ORIGINS- CD&V (Christian-democrat) 236 ,45 ,18 ,85 ,13 
MODEL VLD (liberal) 119 ,22 ,02 ,62 ,11 
 Dependent variables N Mean Min Max Std.Dev. 
 Places child care non-profit sector (relative) 290 ,34 ,00 1,00 ,36 
 Places child care public sector (relative) 290 ,18 ,00 1,00 ,28 
 Places child care commercial (relative) 290 ,48 ,00 1,00 ,36 
 Places elderly care nonprofit (relative) 288 ,50 ,00 1,00 ,42 
 Places elderly care public (relative) 288 ,36 ,00 1,00 ,39 
 Places elderly care commercial (relative) 288 ,14 ,00 1,00 ,29 
 
 
